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Control Share Statutes
FRED AXLEY,*
ROBERTA BLUM STEIN,** AND ANDREW MCCUNE***

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court changed the apparent fortunes
of state takeover legislation when it upheld Indiana's Control Share
Acquisition Chapter' in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.2
The decision surprised many state legislators and legal practitioners,
since prior to CTS, it appeared that the ability of states to regulate
takeover activity was severely limited. This perception arose from the
strong position the plurality of the Supreme Court took in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.3
MITE involved the Illinois Business Take-Over Act 4 which regulated takeover offers where either 10% or more of the owners of the
securities subject to the offer were located in Illinois, or where the
issue of the securities subject to the offer met at least two of the
following three conditions: (1) its principal executive offices were in
Illinois, (2) it was organized under Illinois law, or (3) it had at least
10% of its stated capital or paid-in surplus represented in Illinois.'
The Act required these offers to be registered with the Illinois Secretary of State prior to their commencement. The Act empowered, and
at times required, the Secretary of State to hold hearings on the
adequacy of tender offers, and to deny registration to any offer if he
determined either that the offering materials did not provide full and
fair disclosure to the offerees of all material information concerning
* Partner, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., College of
the Holy Cross; M.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., University of Chicago.
** Associate, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Ohio University; J.D., Northwestern University.
*** Student Clerk at McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Illinois, from the
University of Chicago Law School.
1. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).
2. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
3. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
4. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51 to 137.70 (1981) repealed by Act

No. 83-365, Ill. Legis. Serv. 2628 (West).

5. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10 (1979).
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the offer, or that the offer was inequitable 6or would work, or tend
to work, a fraud or deceit upon the offeree.
In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois
Act. Justice White's opinion, the one in which the largest number of
the Justices joined, 7 held that under the Supremacy Clause, the
provisions granting the Secretary of State power to hold hearings on
8
takeover offers conflicted with the Williams Act and were "preempted by the Williams Act insofar as [the Act] allow[ed] the Illinois
' 9 The
Secretary to pass on the substantive fairness of a tender offer.
Court also found the Act unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
for imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce in relation to
the local interests served, particularly by regulating offers made to
out-of-state shareholders. 0 Between the Court's broad reading of the
comprehensiveness of the Williams Act under the Supremacy Clause
and the stringent balancing test employed under the Commerce Clause,
there seemed to be little room left over for state regulation of takeover
offers. That is, until CTS.
In CTS, the Supreme Court held the Indiana Control Share
Acquisition Chapter" to be constitutional, to the surprise of most of
the takeover bar. The Indiana Chapter differs from the Illinois Act
in a number of fundamental ways, particularly in the nature of state
involvement and regulation of an acquiror's behavior. The Indiana
Chapter is known as a second generation takeover statute because it
was drafted after the MITE decision with provisions specifically
designed to avoid those provisions which the Court found unconstitutional in MITE. Three basic types of second generation statutes
developed after MITE: (1) control share statutes, (2) fair price statutes
and (3) business combination statutes.' 2 Of these, control share statutes have been the most prominent. 3 This article will examine how
REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57(E) (1979).
7. Justice White was joined by Burger, C.J., in the entirety and in Parts I, II

6. ILL.
and V-B
8.
9.
10.

by the whole court.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) & (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1986).
MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.

11. IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).

12. See infra note 15-19 and accompanying text on control share statutes, note

24-29 and accompanying text on fair price statutes, notes 20-23 and accompanying

text on business combination statutes, and notes 30-37 and accompanying text on the
new Delaware statute.
13. The following states have adopted the control share acquisition type of
statute: Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Wisconsin. See
infra note 15.

1988:237]

CONTROL SHARE STATUTES

the second generation control share type statutes operate; how they
have developed and to a lesser degree been litigated about in light of
the Supreme Court's CTS ruling. In addition, various operational
problems which exist with the statutes will be discussed. Finally, the
article concludes that until the constitutionality of the other types of
second generation statutes has been resolved, companies would be
prudent not to rely solely on legislative responses to their takeover
concerns.
II.

A.

OPERATION OF SECOND GENERATION STATUTES

CONTROL SHARE STATUTES

The basic difference between control share statutes and the first
generation statutes like the Illinois Act invalidated in MITE is that
the control share statutes do not involve subjective state activity in
terms of required registration or approval.' 4 Control share and other
state anti-takeover legislation applies to public companies, which are
usually defined as companies with securities registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and other nonpublic companies
which elect to be governed by the legislation. States have adopted
various forms of control share statutes, 5 but all of these statutes
provide that a person may not vote, or in some cases acquire, shares
of a target corporation if, after the acquisition, such person and his
affiliates would beneficially own shares in excess of specified ranges
of outstanding shares (usually 25%, 33 1/3%, and 50%)16 without
the prior approval of the target's disinterested shareholders. When
the limitation is on the ability to vote the control shares, the bar can
be either temporary or permanent. If the bar is permanent, the statute
14. See infra Part III and notes thereto for explanation of how a control share
statute works.
15. See Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to 10-1217 (Supp. 1987);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.109 (West Supp. 1988); Hawaii, HAWAI REV. STAT.
§§ 416-171 to 416-172 (1985); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135 to 12:140.2 (West Supp. 1987); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1OC, §§ I to 13 (West Supp. 1987); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 78.376 to 78.3793 (1985
& Supp. 1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to 55-98 (Supp. 1987);
Ohio, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (West Supp. 1988); Oregon, 1987 Or. Laws ch. 820, §§ I to 11;
and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1987).

16. Shares which result in beneficial ownership in excess of the specified
ranges
are hereinafter referred to as "Control Shares".
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usually provides that if voting rights are not approved, the target
corporation can repurchase the control shares 7 at either the market
price or the price paid by the acquiror if so provided in the charter
or by-laws prior to the control share acquisition.
Another significant difference among the various control share
statutes is in the definition of a target corporation whose stock is
subject to the statute. All statutes have a "minimum contacts" test
between the regulating state and the covered target corporation, but
these tests vary widely. For example, some states require that the
target corporation be incorporated in the state as a necessary minimum
contact for coverage,'" while others may also cover foreign corporations with specified contacts with the state. 19 The result is that a
corporation could conceivably be subject to two or more conflicting
control share statutes.
B. BUSINESS COMBINATION STATUTES

Although less common than control share statutes, some states,
including states which have also adopted control share statutes, have
adopted business combination statutes. 20 Business combination statutes operate very differently from control share statutes, in that they
do not restrain or limit the acquisition or voting of shares. Also, in
almost all cases, control over the takeover transaction is placed in the
hands of the target's board of directors rather than in the hands of
the target's shareholders. After obtaining direct or beneficial ownership of a specified percentage of the target corporation's stock, the
acquiror becomes an "interested shareholder." 2' Without the approval
17. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-10 (West Supp. 1987).
18. See, e.g., Hawaii, HAWAu REV. STAT. §§ 416-171, 416-172(c) (1985); Ohio,
Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01(Y), 1701.831 (Page 1985).
19. See, e.g., Arizona, Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1201(13) (Supp. 1987);
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.015(10) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
20. See Arizona, Ariz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to 10-1223 (Supp. 1987);
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43 (West Supp. 1987); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271A.397 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Minnesota, MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon 1988);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:10A-1 to 14A:10A-6 (West Supp. 1987); New
York, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 108.725 (West

Supp. 1987).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRaP. LAW § 912(a)(10) (McKinney 1986).
(10) "Interested shareholder", when used in reference to any resident

domestic corporation, means any person (other than such resident domestic

corporation or any subsidiary of such resident domestic corporation) that
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of the target's board of directors before becoming an interested
shareholder, an interested shareholder cannot effect a business combination with the target for a specified period of time after the date
on which the interested shareholder first became an interested shareholder. New York's business combination statute, 22 which is the model
on which most of such acts are largely based, sets the percentage at
which a shareholder becomes an interested shareholder at 20% and
the time period within which a business combination may not be
effected at 5 years. A number of states have adopted variations of
the New York scheme. 23 The purpose of business combination statutes
is to discourage hostile takeovers of corporations covered by these
statutes by preventing the acquiror from gaining control of the assets
of the acquired corporation to finance the acquisition by merging
with the target corporation after the acquisition.
C.

FAIR PRICE STATUTES

New York has combined its business combination statute with a
fair price provision. Some states have fair price provisions either alone
or in combination with other anti-takeover measures as in New York. 24

Id.

(A) (i) is the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of twenty percent or
more of the outstanding voting stock of such resident domestic corporation;
or
(ii) is an affiliate or associate of such resident domestic corporation and
at any time within the five-year period immediately prior to the date in
question was the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of twenty percent
or more of the then outstanding voting stock of -such resident domestic
corporation; provided that
(B) for the purpose of determining whether a person is an interested
shareholder, the number of shares of voting stock of such resident domestic
corporation deemed to be outstanding shall include shares deemed to be
beneficially owned by the person through application of subparagraph four
of this paragraph but shall not include any other unissued shares of voting
stock of such resident domestic corporation which may be issuable pursuant
to any agreement, arrangement or understanding, or upon exercise of
conversion rights, warrants or options, or otherwise.

22. N.Y. Bus. Cop, LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986).
23. See New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:IOA-l to 14A:IOA-6 (West Supp.
1987); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217A.397 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1986); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
24. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 910, 912 (McKinney 1986). See Connecticut,

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
ANN. § 607.108 (West Supp.

33-374a to 33-374c (West 1987); Florida, FLA. STAT.
1988); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to 14-2-

235 (Supp. 1987); Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (1985); Kentucky, Ky.
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A fair price provision attempts to prevent the coercion of a target's
shareholders by way of a "two-tiered" or "front-end-loaded" tender
25
offer for the target's stock.
A fair price provision, with some variation among states, generally requires any business combination between the target company
and an interested shareholder to be approved by a specified supermajority vote of the shareholders (or of the disinterested shareholders)
of the target. However, if a certain minimum price is guaranteed for
all target shares in the business combination the requirements of the
provision are not triggered. The Maryland fair price statute26 was one
of the first passed, and it is similar to most statutes adopted after it.
Under the Maryland statute, business combinations with interested

shareholders, in which a minimum price is not guaranteed, require a
favorable recommendation by the target's board of directors and
approval of both 800o0 of all outstanding shares2 and 66 2/3% of all
shares not directly or beneficially owned by the interested shareholder. 28 The definitions of target corporations covered by the acts,
the specified voting percentages, and the minimum fair price differ
with each act. 29 However, the basic goal of each statute is the same,
equal treatment of shareholders.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396 to 271A.398 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:131 to 12:134 (West Supp. 1988); Maryland,
MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1987); Michigan,
MICH. Comr. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1776 to 450.1784 (West Supp. 1987); Mississippi,
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to 79-25-7 (Supp. 1987); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 55-75 to 55-79 (Supp. 1987); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1987); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to 13.1-728
(1985).

25. In a "front-end-loaded" tender offer, the acquiror offers a higher price
for the first shares tendered until he has bought a sufficient number of shares to
gain control of the target and then forces the remaining shareholders to sell out at a
lower price. Shareholders are therefore coerced into tendering their stock immediately
after an offer is made lest they miss the higher initial price even though waiting to

tender may actually be in their best interest.
26. MD. CoPs. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.

§§ 3-601 to 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1987).

27. Id. § 3-602(1).
28. Id. § 3-602(2). For example, if a company has 100 outstanding shares, 30
of which are held by the Interested Shareholder, a favorable vote of at least 80 shares
would be required for approval by all outstanding shares and a favorable vote of at
least 47 shares not owned by the Interested Shareholder would be required for
approval by disinterested shares.
29. As to differences in the target corporations covered, compare NEv. REv.
STAT. §§ 78.3765, 78.3788 (Supp. 1987) with IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (West
Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.19(4) (West Supp. 1988) with N.C. GEN. STAT.
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THE NEW DELAWARE STATUTE

The State of Delaware, in part to maintain its status as the lead
state of incorporation for public companies and to maintain the
franchise tax revenues associated therewith, enacted the first "third
generation" statute on February 2, 1988,30 after the Council of the
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association had
considered and rejected the adoption of a control share statute.3' New
Section 203 is a type of business combination statute which imposes
a three-year moratorium on business combinations with interested
(150/o) shareholders.3 2 Like other business combination statutes, Section 203 contains exceptions if the board of directors of the target
company approves the business combination or the acquisition which
results in a person becoming an interested shareholder before the
person becomes an interested shareholder. 33 In addition, Section 203
will not apply if the directors of the target company who were in
office prior to a person becoming an interested shareholder have
approved a change of control transaction with a person who is not
an interested shareholder.34 However, unlike other business combination statutes, Section 203 has additional exceptions to the three-year
moratorium. The first is if the interested shareholder acquired 850
of the voting stock of the target company, exclusive of shares owned
by individuals who are both officers and directors of the target
company and by certain employee stock plans, in the same transaction
in which it became an interested shareholder. 5 The second excepts a
business combination with the interested shareholder that has been
approved by the board of directors of the target company and by the
affirmative vote of 66 2/3 percent of outstanding voting stock not
§ 55-90(5) (Supp. 1987). As to differences in specified voting percentages, compare
HAWAn REV. STAT. § 416-172(4) (1985) with IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West
Supp. 1987). As to differences in minimum fair price requirements, compare MD.
CosPus. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1987) with N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-77 (Supp. 1987).
30. The provision is codified as Section 203 of the State of Delaware General
Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
31. See Goldman and McNally, The Delaware Takeover Statute: A Report to
the Delaware General Assembly, prepared by members of the Council of the
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association.
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (Supp. 1988).
33. Id. § 203(a)(1).
34. Id. § 203(b)(6).
35. Id. § 203(a)(2).
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owned by the interested shareholder.3 6 Section 203 is limited to
corporations organized under the Delaware General Corporation Law
which have a class of voting stock which is (a) listed on a national
securities exchange, (b) authorized for quotation on an inter dealer
quotation system, or (c) held of record by more than 2,000 share7
holders.1
III.

DEVELOPMENT AND LITIGATION OF CONTROL SHARE STATUTES

Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in CTS, few state control
share or other takeover statutes had been litigated to a final decision
on their constitutional merits. Often the acts were invalidated on an
action for a temporary restraining order (a "TRO"). This leads to
two concerns: whether a TRO might be sufficient to allow a raider to
succeed in a particular offer, and what the effect of the CTS ruling
will be on the statutes summarily invalidated on TRO's before the
CTS ruling. Three cases indicate the kind of treatment state takeover
statutes received before CTS. The rulings in these cases influenced
the drafting of the Indiana statute upheld in CTS. As discussed below,
the Missouri statute was declared invalid for applying to foreign
corporations; the Hawaii statute only covered domestic corporations
but was declared invalid for applying to corporations which did not
have stockholders in Hawaii; and the Ohio statute applied only to
domestic corporations and the target corporation in question had
Ohio shareholders and a manufacturing presence in the state, but
nonetheless the statute was found invalid. The summary nature of the
decisions on TROs, which were the usual methods of challenging
these statutes, contributed to the court's reliance on routine methods
of analysis and the rapid growth of a body of reinforcing precedent.
A.

THE MISSOURI STATUTE

The first case, Icahn v. Blunt,3" involved an attempted use of
Missouri's Control Share Statute39 to protect Trans World Airlines, a
36. Id. § 203(a)(3).
37. Id. § 203(b)(4).

38. 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).

39. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.575 was passed solely to make the Missouri control
share statute, § 351.407, applicable to TWA. Section 351.575(2) provided that
section 351.407 shall apply to those foreign corporations wliich meet the
following criteria: (1) The issuing public corporation has over seven thousand
five hundred employees in Missouri; (2) The issuing public corporation is a
common carrier; and (3) Substantial financial contributions have been made
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Delaware corporation, from a hostile tender offer by Carl Icahn.

Icahn moved to enjoin enforcement of the statute, 4° and to have it
declared invalid for violating the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions.
Missouri's Control Share Acquisition Statute4' covered corporations
incorporated or qualified to do business in Missouri or ones covered
by the specific provisions of § 351.575 as with TWA. The statute

provides that unless such a corporation opted out of the act's coverage
in its articles of incorporation, an acquisition of control shares 42 was

prohibited without prior approval by the target's shareholders. To
gain this approval, the acquiring person first had to submit an

"acquiring person statement" to the target corporation, disclosing
certain information about the acquisition.4 3 The target's board of

directors then had ten days in which to call a shareholders' meeting
to vote on the acquisition." The meeting had to be held at least thirty

and no more than fifty days following the date on which the target
received the "acquiring person statement." ' 45 The favorable vote of
both two-thirds of all shares entitled to vote at the meeting and twothirds of all shares excluding interested shares 46 were required for
approval.
towards the development and expansion of physical facilities for the benefit
of said issuing public corporations by city, county or public authority in the
state of Missouri.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.575(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
40. Icahn, 6i2 F. Supp. at 1402.
41. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
42. Defined as an acquisition of shares when combined with the acquiror's
other shares gives the acquiror for the first time "(a) One-fifth or more but less than
one-third of such voting power; (b) One-third or more but less than a majority of
such voting power; [or] (c) A majority or more of such voting power;" Id. § 351-

015(6).

43. Id. § 351.407(2). Statement must include such information as the acquiror's
identity, number of shares to be acquired, method of acquisition, number of shares
currently owned or controlled and anticipated resulting range of voting power.
44. Id. § 351.407(3).
45. Id. § 351.407(3).
46. Id. § 351.015(9).
"Interested shares" means the shares of an issuing public corporation in
respect of which any of the following persons may exercise or direct the
exercise of the voting power of the corporation in the election of directors:
(a) An acquiring person or member of a group with respect to a control
share acquisition;
(b) Any officer of the issuing public corporation elected or appointed by
the directors of the issuing public corporation;
(c) Any employee of the issuing public corporation who is also a director
of such corporation;
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Setting aside the state constitutional questions, the Icahn court
examined the Missouri statute's validity under the Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses. Under the Commerce Clause, the court employed
the reasoning in MITE to find that the application of the Missouri
Control Share Acquisition Statute to foreign corporations was a direct
burden on interstate commerce, as it attempted to control conduct
beyond the borders of Missouri. 47 The court also invalidated the
statute under the Supremacy Clause as conflicting with the Williams
Act. 48 The court stated that the intent of the Williams Act was to
protect shareholders in cash tender offers, and that "[njeutrality in
contests for control was an important characteristic of the legislative
approach adopted in the Williams Act." ' 49 The Icahn court found the
".. . regulatory scheme [upset] congress' efforts to protect the investor without favoring either the purchaser or incumbent management" 50
because in effect it favored incumbent management. The court also
found that the statute conflicted with the disclosure and timing
requirements for a tender offer imposed by Section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and with Section 13 of that Act, since it
prevented a person seeking to make a control share acquisition from
buying shares on the open market until shareholder approval has been
obtained."
For these reasons, enforcement of Missouri's Control Shares
Acquisition Statute was permanently enjoined against a person making
an acquisition in a corporation not incorporated in Missouri. The
court's concern about the extraterritorial applications of other Missouri statutes perhaps left room for a narrower statute to pass
constitutional muster. However, the invalidation of Hawaii's Control
Share Acquisition Statute 2 in Terry v. Yamashita53 seemed to provide
that extraterritoriality was not the primary consideration.
B.

THE HAWAII STATUTE

The Hawaii statute applied only to corporations incorporated
under the laws of Hawaii. The only other nexus requirement was that
the corporation have "its principal place of business or substantial
Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at 1416.
Id. at 1419-20.
Id. at 1419.
Id. at 1420.
Id.
52. HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 416-171 to 416-172 (1985).
53. 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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assets located in this state." 54 However, there was no requirement
that a single shareholder be a resident of Hawaii. The court found
that "[b]ecause the Hawaii CSA statute [had] an extraterritorial effect
and [could] be applied to regulate purchases even when no shareholder
[was] a resident of the regulating state, it comprise[d] a direct burden
on interstate commerce and [was] invalid."" The court found that
any local benefits Hawaii could gain from protecting a local corporation were far outweighed by the costs of frustrating the transfer of
stock by out-of-state shareholders.5 6 The court also found that Hawaii's statute conflict with the Williams Act by barring the acquiror
from buying more than 10% of the target's stock without the approval
of a majority of voting shares excluding the acquiror's shares. The
prohibition was particularly troubling in light of the fact that the
target's management could indefinitely delay the results of the vote,
since the statute set no time limit on the corporation's tallying of the
votes.
The court granted a temporary restraining order against the
enforcement of the Hawaii control share statute, but denied a permanent injunction. This decision set the stage for the finding of
Ohio's Control Share Acquisition Act" unconstitutional in Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman.5
C.

THE OHIO STATUTE

The Ohio Act59 was found unconstitutional for violating both the
Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause in Fleet Aerospace.6
The Ohio Act prohibited an acquiring person from even purchasing
any shares which would qualify as control shares unless the proposed
acquisition was authorized by a vote of the shareholders and would
take place solely in accordance with the authorized terms and was
consummated within 360 days of the shareholder authorization. 6'
54. HAWAn REV. STAT. § 416-171 (1985).
55. Terry, 643 F. Supp.' at 165.
56. Terry, 643 F. Supp. at 166.
57. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985).
58. 637 F.Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986),
vacated sub nom., Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S.Ct. 1949 (1987). After
CTS, a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Ohio Act was denied in
Veere, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Civil Action No. C-88-0571A (N.D.
Ohio, March 16, 1988).
59. Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page 1985).
60. Fleet Aerospace, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986).
61. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(E) (Page 1985).
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"[T]he Ohio Act frustrate[d] the objectives of the Williams Act in a
substantial manner ...

[by] impermissibly tip[ping]the scales in favor

of incumbent management by requiring a shareholder vote and by

creating a delay." ' 62 The court also found that the act ". . . impacted
substantially on interstate commerce . . . [and] that it constituted a

direct regulation upon, as well as an indirect burden on, interstate
commerce that violated the Commerce Clause... "63 The court made
these findings despite the fact that the Ohio act applied only to Ohio
64
corporations, and that the target corporation in Fleet Aerospace,
while having its principal executive office in Charlotte, North Carolina, was an Ohio corporation and had a manufacturing plant, as well
as shareholders, in Ohio.
As the precedential weight began to build, the inquiry by the
courts was becoming routine and mechanical. Despite the variety of
statutes and situations at hand, courts continued to be troubled by
the same issues of federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause
and burdens on interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. It
seemed that no state could find a way to limit coverage to a class of
corporations to which the courts would not object.
D.

THE INDIANA STATUTE

When Indiana's Control Share Acquisition Chapter 65 was challenged in CTS v. Dynamics Corporationof America,66 therefore, most
lawyers working in the takeover area felt sure that the courts would
invalidate the Indiana statute, just as they had invalidated previous
statutes. The reasoning of the district court did in fact largely follow
the routine analyses concerning the Williams Act and the Commerce
Clause in finding the statute invalid. 67 A sweepingly powerful decision
by the Seventh Circuit affirming the district court's decision seemed
to sound the final death knell for state control share statutes. In
speaking for the court, Judge Posner went beyond the district court's
objections to the statute and explained at length further theoretical
and market efficiency reasons for invalidating the Indiana legislation. 61
Under the analysis in MITE, the Seventh Circuit found the Indiana
69
Chapter to be clearly invalid.
62. Fleet Aerospace, 796 F.2d at 139.
63. Id.
64. Aeronca Inc. was a target of Fleet Aerospace Corp. of Canada. Id. at 136.

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1987).

107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987).
CTS, 637 F.Supp. 389, 406 (N.D. I11. 1986).
CTS, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 263.
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The Supreme Court's ruling in CTS,7 0 however, saved state
legislation in the takeover area. The reprieve came for two basic
reasons, careful and attentive drafting by Indiana and an apparent
change in the Supreme Court's view regarding the value of mergers.
The provisions of Indiana's statute were carefully drafted to
respond to the courts' objections to previous control share statutes.
Three -main classes of provisions had to be dealt with: first, the
provisions which had caused the Illinois statute to be invalidated in
MITE; second, the provisions which had been found to conflict with
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause; and finally, the
provisions which failed under the Supremacy Clause.
A major criterion involved in the invalidation of the Illinois
statute had been its bias in favor of the target's management over the
offeror. 71 This bias was found to be contrary to the aim of the federal
securities laws to protect the interests of the shareholders without
favoring either management or the acquiror.72 The Supreme Court
found that Indiana had solved this problem by placing the power to
authorize voting rights for control share blocks solely with shareholders and by excluding any "interested" shares from voting. 73 The result
is that '.'. . . the statute . . . protects the independent shareholder
against both of the contending parties. ' 74 The Court also found that
Indiana's requirement that the offeror pay the costs of the special
shareholder meeting held to vote on the voting rights did not impose
an unreasonable expense on the acquiror, thereby favoring management. 175 Since the Indiana Chapter applied only to corporations incorporated in Indiana, with substantial contacts with Indiana and a
substantial number of shareholders resident in Indiana, 76 it also avoided
the problems of extraterritorial application found invalid in MITE.
Careful drafting in response to the Court's objections to the
Illinois statute in MITE also helped the Indiana statute overcome
many of the previous Commerce Clause objections. The Supreme
Court resoundingly rejected the view prevalent in the district courts
that acts such as Indiana's discriminated against interstate commerce,
70. CTS, 107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987).
71. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634.
72. Id. at 634.

73.

IND. CoDE ANN.

§ 23-1-42-9(b) (West Supp. 1987).

74. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1645.
75. Id. at 1646 n.7. The Court said if the offeror waited until a regular
shareholders meeting to call a vote the corporation would have to bear the expense
so for a special meeting it was fair for the offeror to bear the expense.
76. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(e) (West Supp. 1987).
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and found instead that because the Indiana act applied even-handedly
to both in-state and out-of-state offerors, it could not be discriminatory.7 7 Similarly, the Court found that "[s]o long as each state
regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has created, each
corporation will be subject to the law of only one State." 7 8 Thus,
interstate commerce could not be adversely affected by inconsistent
state regulations being applicable to the same offer.
The Court's preemption analysis under the Supremacy Clause
focused more on the specific effects of the Indiana statute's requirements on the particular offer involved. Since the Indiana statute
prohibited the voting, rather than the purchase of control shares, the
Court did not have to consider whether a bar on acquisition would
conflict with the freedom to purchase tendered shares under the
Williams Act. The basic question was, therefore, whether the Indiana
statute, which in effect required that offers be held open for a
minimum of 50 days 79 if the offeror wanted to assure himself that he
would be purchasing voting shares, conflicted with or frustrated the
federal requirements set out under the Williams Act. This conflict
had been the basis of the earlier preemption analyses.
The Court began by noting that a direct conflict did not exist
because the 50 day Indiana requirement was shorter than 60 day
maximum period for which tender offers may remain open as provided
in the Williams Act.80 Moreover, the fact that the 50 day requirement
meant offers had to remain open 30 days longer than the Williams
Act 20 business day minimum was not a substantial enough factor to
find that the requirement frustrated the Williams Act.8 This delay
also did not create significant enough a benefit to the target company
(e.g. by giving it time to find a white knight) to destroy the William's
Act's even-handedness.8 2 The Court's conclusion that "[tihe regulatory conditions that the "[Indiana] Act places on tender offers are
consistent with the text and purposes of the Williams Act" 3 led it to
hold that the Indiana statute was not preempted by the Williams Act.
77. "Because nothing in the Indiana Act imposes a greater burden out-of-state
offerors .than it does on similarly situated Indiana offerors, we reject the contention
that the Act discriminates against interstate commerce." CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649.
78. The States' authority for such regulation, the Court found, came from
their "authority to regulate domestic corporations. . .

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

."

CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649.

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7(b) (West Supp. 1987).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1639.
Id. at 1647.
Id. at 1648.
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The second reason the Indiana Chapter was not invalidated
probably had less to do with Indiana's careful drafting than with a
change since MITE in the Court's view on the value of mergers. The
MITE decision, in striking down the Illinois act, seemed to lawyers
and others working in the mergers and acquisitions area, and to many
lower courts, to signal a real bias in the Supreme Court in favor of
the freedom to merge and acquire and against states' interests in
protecting shareholders. In many respects, the emphasis in the Seventh
Circuit's CTS opinion on the economic efficiency of mergers and
acquisitions was a direct result of the Supreme Court's decision in
MITE. However, in reversing the Circuit Court in CTS, the Supreme
Court left no doubt that the scope of its reasoning in MITE had been
exceeded.8
The Court in CTS emphasized the basic principle that corporations are creatures of state legislation."s Therefore, they can properly
be regulated by the incorporating state, as long as such regulation did
not violate the United States Constitution. Whatever negative incentive
or efficiency effects state regulation might have would not "substantially affect" the Court's analysis .16 The Court clearly held that state
interference with mergers or acquisitions was not of any controlling
constitutional significance.8 7
The Supreme Court's dramatic reversal in CTS has caused many
state legislatures to either revise their existing takeover legislation or
to adopt such legislation, and, in doing so, to test how far state
regulation of tender offers may constitutionally go.
IV.

QUESTIONS UNANSWERED BY

CTS

Many state statutes still have extraterritorial provisions, which
the Supreme Court does not appear to favor. 88 It appears that at least
84. "We think the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance for
Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance
is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state
law." CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649.
85. Id.

86. Id. at 1652.
87. Id. at 1651.
88. See Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.671, 302A.011 subd. 39 (West
Supp. 1988); Arizona, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201(13), 10-1211(B) (Supp.
1987); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 452(8) (West 1987) (invalidated on
TRO in TLX Acquisitions Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla.
1987) and validation challenged in pending TRO action Union Pacific Corp. v.
USPCI., No. Civ-87-2307-P (W.D. Okla. November 27, 1987)); North Carolina,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to 55-98 (Supp. 1987).
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some states have adopted or retained extraterritorial provisions in
order to determine if it is possible to define a level of contacts with
the state which are constitutional without requiring actual incorporation within the state. The recent invalidation of Oklahoma's statute
on the basis of its extraterritoriality indicates that incorporation may
indeed be a minimum requirement.8 9 In a subsequent action challenging the Oklahoma statute, the argument was made that if there are
sufficient contacts with a state, that state can constitutionally regulate
certain internal corporate matters such as voting rights.9
Another question left open by CTS is whether mere incorporation
is a sufficient contact to enable a state to regulate in the takeover
area. This is especially pertinent in Delaware, since new Section 203
requires no contacts with the state other than incorporation. While
the holding in Terry v. Yamashita91 and dicta in CTS 2 would suggest
that before a state may act to protect its domestic corporations there
must also be domestic shareholders to protect, as a general proposition, the application of a state's corporate law to its domestic corporations has never been dependent upon any further contacts with
that state. However, this and other aspects of Section 203 can be
93
expected to be determined by the courts in the near future.
The present generation of statutes also contain provisions which
were not addressed by the Supreme Court in CTS. For example, the
Massachusetts statute requires that the record date for the shareholders
meeting, held to vote on authorization of voting rights for a control
share block, must be a date before the takeover activity began. 94 The
purpose of this requirement seems to prevent arbitrageurs from purchasing large blocks of stock, and then voting this stock to authorize
89. TLX Acquisitions, 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
90. See Union Pacific, No. Civ-87-2307-P (W.D. Okla. November 27, 1987).
See also Western Airlines v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
91. 643 F.Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986). See supra Part II B and notes thereto.
92. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1652.
93. In April, 1988, preliminary injunctive relief was denied to a hostile bidder
for Koppers Co., as the judge felt that Section 203 would probably be found
constitutional. BNS Inc. v. Koppers, Civil Action No. 88-130-MMS (D. Del. April
1, 1988). Similarly, in May, 1988, preliminary injunctive relief was denied to a hostile
bidder for Staley Continental, Inc., as that judge felt that the bidder was unlikely to
prevail on the merits of its constitutional challenge, RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley
Continental, Inc., Civil Action No. 88-190-JRR (D. Del. May 9, 1988), despite
arguments by the Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae, that Section
203 was unconstitutional.
94. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IIOC, § 3 (West Supp. 1987).
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voting rights so they can sell the stock acquired at a profit in a
subsequent merger. The North Carolina statute requires a supermajority vote of 9570 of all disinterested shares to accord voting rights
to acquired control shares. 95 The effect of such a high voting requirement is that a raider holding 50% of the target's stock could be
prevented from voting its shares by a shareholder holding only 2.5%
of the stock. The Minnesota 96 and Arizona97 statutes both provide
that a shareholders' meeting to vote on whether to accord voting
rights to a control share block may not be called unless the acquiror
first delivers to the target corporation copies of definitive financing
agreements for any part of the control share acquisition which is not
funded directly by the offeror. This requirement may deter an offeror
since it increases its costs, by requiring it to obtain financing commitments earlier than it otherwise would, or, if the shareholders do
not vote in favor of according voting rights by requiring it to obtain
unneeded financing commitments. Banks generally charge a commitment fee of a percentage of the amount of the committed financing,
accruing from the date of the commitment. However, the requirement
does provide some assurance to shareholders who decide to sell their
shares to the offeror that funds are available to pay for the shares.
Provisions such as these could be upheld as furthering a valid policy
goal, but their validity has not yet been challenged and remains in
doubt.
Finally, a number of states have adopted business combination
statutes which apply regardless of whether voting rights have been
accorded to the control shares28 The risk of this approach is that
combining an otherwise constitutional control share statute with an
unconstitutional business combination statute may result in the both
statutes being viewed as a single package and invalidated.
Further uncertainty exists because state takeover statutes have
usually been challenged in actions for TROs. In light of the Supreme
Court's rejection in CTS of many of the objections of lower courts
to state takeover statutes, it is possible that many statutes found
invalid on a TRO may in fact be constitutional, giving rise to the
possibility of retro-active application.
Due to the nature of court decisions and the variety of approaches
to takeover legislation taken by the states, especially post-CTS, the
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-76 (Supp. 1987).
96. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 subd. 4 (West Supp. 1988).
97. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1214 (Supp. 1987).
98. See Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1221 (Supp. 1987); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988).
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possible avenues of challenge to takeover statutes are abundant. It is
difficult to predict how courts will view business combination provisions, since these have not yet been widely challenged.9 However,
these statutes may not meet the requirement apparently imposed by
the Supreme Court in CTS that neither the target nor the offeror be
given an advantage because they place considerable power in the
target's board, which can make a supermajority vote necessary merely
by refusing to recommend an offer. Fair price provisions may fare
better in that they are intended to protect shareholders, as are the
provisions of the Williams Act. However, they may be found to give
the target's management an impermissible advantage over the offeror
because they generally apply only if the target's board does not
recommend the offer. Assuming no extraterritoriality problems, the
only other major constitutional problem in state takeover statutes is
timing. The statutory time frame for any required shareholder vote
must not cause a conflict with the 60 day maximum time period
during which tender offers may remain open under the Williams Act.
There are a number of possible challenges to control share
acquisition statutes, even after CTS. The precise minimum requirements of state nexus have yet to be determined, as evidenced by the
Oklahoma legislation. 1°° Also, although the burden on interstate commerce was clearly subordinated in CTS to a state's right to regulate
that which its own legislation created, state takeover legislation which
applies extraterritorially could be attacked under the Commerce Clause.
This would be true of a situation in which several states require the
offeror to conform with conflicting regulations. Absent extraterritoriality problems, most challenges will probably be based upon a statute
giving an impermissible advantage to the target. The Court's position
in CTS that the delay resulting from holding a shareholders meeting
to determine the offeror's voting rights, during which time the target
company would have time to organize a defense, was not an impermissible advantage leads to the conclusion that an advantage must be
99. The New Jersey business combination statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A: 10A1 to 14A: 10A-6 (West Supp. 1987), was challenged in connection with Paul Bilzerian's
successful acquisition of Singer Co. in late 1987. However, the parties settled their
litigation before an opinion was issued. The Wisconsin business combination statute,
WisC. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1987), was held unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause in RTE Corporation v. Mark IV Industries,Inc., Civil Action No.
88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988). The RTE opinion was a preliminary opinion in
which Judge Evans promised a more detailed supplementary opinion. As of this
writing, the supplementary opinion has not yet been issued.
100. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 452(8), 453 (West 1987).
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255

relatively direct to be subject to attack. A conflict with or frustration
of federal law may still provide a valid basis for attack under the
Supremacy Clause. However, in CTS the Court required that compliance with both the state and federal requirements must be impossible,
not just merely burdensome, for a statute to be unconstitutional under
the Supremacy Clause. 01
V.

OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS WITH CONTROL SHARE AND OTHER
STATUTES

In addition to possible constitutional problems, numerous operational problems also exist with the existing control share statutes. A
major problem is one of definition. Many acts do not clearly define
what corporations are covered by the act, often because the act was
passed hurriedly in response to a specific takeover offer.102 The effect
is that the act has an invalid extraterritorial application, even if none
was intended.
Many acts also do not adequately define the term "group" for
the purposes of determining when individual offerors are considered
collectively as one offeror for computing the number of control shares
acquired or controlled, particularly in relation to grandfather clauses. 103
In smaller public companies where there is a large concentration of
ownership in a family, the definition of group, or the lack of a clear
definition, may interfere with estate planning structures, voting trust
structures and readjustments among the pre-existing voting block. For
instance, transfers of stock among trust beneficiaries may put the
entire block of shares outside the grandfather clause, with the result
that the shares could not be voted without shareholder approval. This
problem could be corrected by the express inclusion of pre-existing
voting blocks in the definition of group or in the grandfather clause,
or by carefully drafted exclusions from the definition of control share
acquisitions. For example, transfers of legal ownership or control
which do not result in changes in beneficial ownership or control
could be excluded from the definition of control share acquisitions.

101. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1644.

102. See, e.g., Arizona's control shares statute, was introduced in the Arizona

legislature on July 21, 1987, was passed the next day and signed into law, just to
protect Greyhound. Boeing got Washington to pass legislation to protect it from T.

Boone Pickens in 11 days and Minnesota passed legislation to protect Dayton-Hudson
from Dart in only one week. Pamepinto & Heard, New State Regulation of Corporate
Takeovers, Nat. L.J., Sept. 21, 1987, at 26, col. 1.
103. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-2(d), 2(e) (West Supp. 1987).
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Another operational problem is the allocation of the costs of the
special shareholders' meeting between the offeror and the target
corporation. The Court in CTS stated that it was fair to require the
offeror to bear all of these costs, 1° 4 but it is still unclear what costs
are to be properly included as meeting costs. The actual shareholders'
meeting also presents many problems. The results of the meeting must
be tabulated and delivered to the offeror within the time constraints
of the Williams Act. A requirement such as Minnesota's that an
offeror have his financing in place before a shareholders' meeting
may be called might compound the problem of meeting the Williams
Act deadlines. 105 Also, with regard to statutes such as Massachusetts,
which require that record dates be set at dates prior to the takeover
activity, questions will invariably arise concerning precisely when the
record date should be.
A different type of problem could result if the Securities and
Exchange Commission adopts regulations prohibiting changes in voting rights of outstanding securities requirements. 1°6 Such a regulation
could invalidate the application of the control share statutes which
apply only if a target elects to be covered, or which do not apply if
a target elects not to be covered by the statute. A more direct
nullification may result from federal legislative action.1°7 Legislative
hearings in the fall 1987 congressional term addressed the question of
whether there should be one federal law to forestall the development
of a state-by-state patchwork of different provisions but as of the
date of this article no legislation has been adopted.
A final operational problem is how those measures should be
adopted by opting-in or opting-out, whichever the applicable state
statute requires. Should a board vote to opt-in or opt-out be sufficient
or should a shareholder approval or ratification be required? And if
ratification is required should it be within a week, a month, three
months? Or should the matter be left entirely up to the shareholders

104. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1646 n.7.
105. Congress has established a 60 day maximum period for tender offers. 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1986); CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1647.
106. Proposed SEC rule 19c-4 would prohibit the listing or quoting of "any
common stock or equity or security of a domestic issuer if, on or after May 15,
1987, the issuer of such security issues any class of security or takes other corporate
action that would have the effect of nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing
the per share voting rights of. holders of an outstanding class or classes of common
stock of such issuer. . ." (emphasis added) See H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1987).

107. Id.
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- even though they might not be able to meet and vote quickly enough
to avail themselves of the act to avoid a hostile offer?
These operational types of problems are present in differing
degrees in all state takeover legislation. Individually, each problem is
not unmanageable. However, the takeover provisions, and therefore
their, problems, are interrelated, and the operational problems can
quickly become serious.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As of the writing of this article, only a control share statute
which is identical in language and effect to the Indiana statute found
constitutional by the Supreme Court in CTS is certain to pass constitutional muster. As noted by the Council of the Corporation Law
Section of the Delaware State Bar Association, however, control share
statutes could have the effect of making it easy and inexpensive for a
raider to put a company "into play". 0 Reliance on Section 203 or a
business combination or fair price statute, carries the risk that the
statute may not be constitutional.
If Section 203 is indicative of what can be expected in the third
generation statutes, it becomes apparent that while state legislatures
desire to be responsive to the demands of their corporation constituencies, at the same time they are becoming sensitized to constitutional
analysis employed by courts in the review of takeover legislation and,
in response, are enacting statutes which contain significant exceptions
and, therefore, are not "show-stoppers".
Until the constitutionality of the various other second and third
generation statutes has been resolved, it remains prudent for companies to retain or include protective provisions in their charters or bylaws. Since charter and by-law provisions are viewed as a product of
the freedom of contract, shareholder control and protection provisions
are permitted in virtually every state, and their wisdom or effect have
not been questioned by the courts as long as they are properly
approved.' °9 In addition, such provisions may be "tailor-made" to fit
the particular facts and circumstances of the adopting company, which
seems to be better than an "off-the-rack" statutory protection which
may or may not fit all the companies incorporated under the laws of
the enacting state.

108. See supra note 31.
109. Charter and by-law provisions must be authorized, or not prohibited, by
applicable law, and must receive the requisite approval of the directors and/or the
shareholders.

